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CURBING BROKER-DEALERS' ABUSIVE SALES
PRACTICES: DOES PROFESSOR JENSEN'S INTEGRITY
FRAMEWORK OFFER A BETTER APPROACH?
BarbaraBlack*

Retail investors, particularly senior citizens, need competent
and careful investment advice more than ever before. With the
decline of fixed-benefit pensions,' U.S. workers must substantially
fund their own retirements, yet many enter or near retirement with
inadequate savings. 2 In addition, the current environment of low
interest rates exacerbates the problems of those living on fixed
incomes. 3 Many investors are not qualified to deal with these
challenges; surveys show that retail investors as a whole lack basic
financial literacy. 4 Consequently, many must rely on the services
provided by investment advice providers, including broker-dealers.5
Regulators have sounded the alarm about sales of risky, complex
products to retail customers in search of better returns ("chasing

* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law
Center. I thank Alan Palmiter and the editors of the Law Review for inviting
me to participate in this symposium.
1. Managing
Lifetime
Income,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://investor.gov/employment-retirement/retirement/managinglifetime-income (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (reporting trend away from defined
benefit plans and toward defined contribution plans).

2. See Mark Twigg, The Future of Retirement-A New Reality, HSBC 5, 8
(2013), http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network/retail-banking
/retirement/the-future-of-retirement-a-new-reality-flipbook#/8/
(noting
key
findings, including: (1) fifty-six percent of U.S. respondents think their
retirement preparations are inadequate; (2) on average, U.S. respondents
expect their retirement to last eighteen years, but their retirement savings to
last for only ten years; and (3) there is an overreliance on dwindling state
benefits).
3. See Shefali Anand, Low Interest Rates Force Creative Choices, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 4, 2013, at R12 (discussing the impact of low interest rates on bond
investments).
4. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY
AMONG INVESTORS, at vii-viii (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-partl.pdf (discussing the findings of a
report from the Library of Congress regarding the financial literacy of retail
investors).
5. This Essay focuses on broker-dealers' sales practices and does not
address the sales practices of investment advisers.
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yield"), especially senior citizens and retirees.6 Both the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") have identified abusive brokerdealer sales practices as priorities in their examinations of brokerdealers7 and have brought numerous enforcement actions against
broker-dealers for sales practices that harm retail investors.8 These
enforcement actions frequently allege both failures of the firms' due
diligence processes to assure the suitability of recommended
investments and failures of the supervisory and compliance systems
that are supposed to detect and deter impermissible sales practices.
In this Essay, I explore whether Michael Jensen's integrity
framework9 could provide an effective alternative for improving
broker-dealers' sales practices.
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
The relationship between the retail customer, on the one hand,
and her registered representative and the broker-dealer with whom
the registered representative is associated, on the other, is a
paradigm of the agency relationship described by Professors Jensen
and Meckling in their classic 1976 article. 10 They identify three
types of costs inherent in the agency relationship: monitoring
expenditures by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent,
and residual loss-or the divergence between the agent's decisions
and those that maximize the principal's welfare."
The ability of the retail customer (the principal) to monitor the
performance of her registered representative, to assure that he is
making decisions consistent with her investment objectives, is
minimal. Because of investors' general low level of financial literacy
and the complexity of investment products, it is difficult for most
retail customers to assess the investment choices recommended by
the registered representatives who service their accounts, with the

6. See Nathaniel Popper, Complex Investments Prove Risky as Savers
Chase Bigger Payoff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at Al (quoting a Federal
Reserve governor's concerns that "investors desperate for yield could be creating
a bubble in widely available investments like junk bonds").
7. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See generally Werner Erhard & Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity
into Finance: A Purely Positive Approach (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Orgs.
2013),
available at
No.
12-074,
Paper
Mkts.,
Research
&
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985594 (asserting that inserting integrity into the
theory and practice of finance could increase workability, value, and quality of
life).
10. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN.
305, 309 (1976) (stating that a stockholder's relationship with the manager of a
corporation "fit[s] the definition of a pure agency relationship").
11. Id. at 308.
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possible exception of gross forms of fraud, like churning or
unauthorized transactions, that customers might detect from a
review of their account statements. Accordingly, whenever brokerdealers or their registered representatives recommend securities
transactions or investment strategies to a retail customer, FINRA
requires them to have a reasonable basis to believe that the
recommendations are suitable for the customer based on the
customer's investment profile.12 This requires understanding both
the customer's investment objectives and the key features of the
recommended investment. Because of the complexity of many
investments, however, the registered representatives who are
selling the products may have an imperfect understanding of their
key features.
Registered broker-dealers must incur significant bonding
expenditures in recognition of customers' dependence on them.
Broker-dealers are required to have in place an extensive system of
supervisory procedures and controls to detect and deter violative
conduct on the part of their registered representatives.1 3
Compliance officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with
numerous laws and regulations that regulate every aspect of the
firm's business, including the sales practices of the registered
representatives. 14 Because compliance systems are expensive and
interfere with selling activities, however, some firms do not
implement adequate systems, and even firms with adequate
regulatory controls cannot be completely effective in preventing
abuses.
Finally, conflicts of interest are "endemic" to the securities
industry.15 Broker-dealers typically sell products on a commission
basis, so there is a direct connection between the product sold and
the compensation received by the registered representative, which
serves as an incentive to select more expensive products for the

12. 2111. Suitability, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display
.html?rbid=2403&recordid=14960&elementid=9859&highlight=2111#rl4960
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
13. 3010. Supervision, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display
_main.html?rbid=2403&element id=3717 (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); 3012.
Supervisory Control System, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display
/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=3722 (last visited Sept. 28, 2013);

3130. Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid
=6286 (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
14. For a description of this external "panopticon" approach, see James A.
Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Financial
Firms 19-23 (Sept. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=2321317.
15. NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, 1 BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION § 1.08 (4th ed. 2007).
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customer.16 The losses suffered by retail customers because of the
broker-dealer's fraud, bias, or incompetence are substantial and can
have devastating effects on the financial well-being of retail
customers and their families.
In recent years, regulators have expressed growing concern
about aggressive sales pitches aimed at retail investors. The SEC
has identified fraud in connection with sales practices aimed at
retail investors as a priority in its examination of broker-dealers.17
These practices include "unsuitable recommendations of higher yield
products (e.g., unsuitable recommendations of municipal or
corporate bonds), as well as improper supervision and due diligence
processes regarding those recommendations or those products" and
"conflicts of interest that are not appropriately mitigated, and are
not clearly disclosed in an understandable and timely manner." 18
Similarly, in identifying its 2013 regulatory and examination
priorities, FINRA "recognizes that retail investors have been
challenged to find attractive returns within their risk tolerance" and
has identified as a key concern "sales practice abuses, yield-chasing
behaviors and the potential impact of any market correction,
external stress event or market dislocation on market prices."19 In
particular, FINRA notes that,
[g]iven the market conditions discussed above, we are
particularly
concerned
about firms'
and registered
representatives' full understanding of complex or high-yield
products, potential failures to adequately explain the riskversus-return profile of certain products, as well as a
and risk
disconnect between customer expectations
tolerances.2 0
II. EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE SALES PRACTICES
The broker-dealer's suitability obligation is paramount in retail
investor protection. 2 1 Whenever the firm and its salespersons

16. But see Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers-What's in a Name?, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 45-46 (2005) (noting that some brokerage firms
promoted fee-based accounts so that brokers are not financially motivated to
give advice to generate sales commissions, but these accounts generated their
own problems).

17. OCIE National Exam Program:Examination Prioritiesfor 2013, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 7 (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about
/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2013.pdf.
18. Id.
19. 2013 Regulatory and Examination PrioritiesLetter, FINRA 1 (Jan. 11,
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents
2013),
/industry/pl97649.pdf.
20. Id.
21. See 2111. Suitability, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.comlen/display
/displayviewall.html?rbid=2403&elementid=9859&print=1 (last visited Sept.

2013]1

BROKER-DEALERS'ABUSIVE SALES

775

recommend a security or an investment strategy, they must perform
due diligence to ascertain that the security or strategy is suitable for
To do this, the salesperson making the
the customer. 22
recommendation must be knowledgeable about the features of the
security or strategy he is recommending and the financial
circumstances and investment objectives of the customer in order to
ascertain that they correspond. 23 This requires the firm to research
the products it sells and to educate the salespersons about them. In
addition, the broker-dealer must have in place adequate supervisory
systems to guard against the registered representative's failures. 24
Unsuitable recommendations may be the product of fraud if, for
example, the firm is knowingly peddling interests in a Ponzi scheme,
in which case the customer will have a federal securities fraud
claim. 25 Frequently, however, unsuitable recommendations may be
the product of incompetence, carelessness, or biased judgment if, for
example, the firm's due diligence about the product was inadequate
or the registered representative did not understand the information
about the product communicated to him by the research
In those instances, the customer has no federal
department.
remedy. 2 6 Whatever the cause of the unsuitable recommendation,
the resulting financial loss can be devastating to the investor.
To illustrate abusive sales practices, I briefly describe five types
of investments sold by broker-dealers that have recently been the
subject of regulatory action: auction rate securities ("ARSs"), private
placements, non-traded real estate investment trusts ("REITs"),
proprietary mutual funds, and variable annuities.
28, 2013) ("The suitability rule is fundamental to fair dealing and is intended to
promote ethical sales practices and high standards of professional conduct.").
22. See 2111. Suitability, supra note 12 ("A member or associated person
must have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the
customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable diligence
of the member or associated person to ascertain the customer's investment

profile.").
23. See id. (defining a customer's investment profile); see also 2111.
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html
FINRA,
Suitability,
(last
?rbid=2403&recordid=14960&elementid=9859&highlight=2111#rl4960
visited Sept. 28, 2013) (refer to Rule 2111(a)).

24. See generally Additional Guidance on FINRA's New Suitability Rule,
FINRA (May 2012), http://finra.complinet.cominetfilestore/newrulebooks/fli
/FlNRANoticel2_25.pdf (addressing issues faced by the securities industry as
firms revise compliance strategies).
25. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)
(antifraud provision); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (creating
liability for any misstatement or omission of a material fact).

26. See generally Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A
Federal Remedy for Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus.
L. 101 (2006) (arguing that a fundamental deficiency in federal securities
regulation is that customers have no federal remedy for incompetent or careless
investment advice).
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A.

Auction Rate Securities
ARSs are debt instruments or preferred shares whose interest
rates or dividends are reset at frequent intervals through auctions
that also provide liquidity for investors wishing to sell. 2 7 During the
financial crisis many ARSsauctions failed, leaving investors with
illiquid investments.28 In 2008 and 2009, the SEC and other
regulators entered into settlements with a number of securities
firms involving charges that the firms' salespersons misrepresented
that ARSs were safe, liquid investments that were the equivalent of
As a result of these
cash or money market funds. 29
misrepresentations, many retail investors invested funds they
needed to have available on a short-term basis and lost the ability to
access those funds when the credit markets froze.3 0 Because these
actions were settled without any findings or admissions, we do not
know whether the SEC could have established that the
misrepresentations constituted securities fraud.
It is likely,
however, that the agency could have established that the firms and
their salespersons made negligent misrepresentations about the
nature and risks of ARSs that misled customers and caused them
serious injury.
B.

PrivatePlacements
Securities that are offered for sale in private placements are not
subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933.31 As a result, the Securities Act limits these offerings to
sophisticated investors or others who "do not need the protections of
the Act." 32 In addition, because these investments are illiquid and
frequently involve high risk, purchasers bear the significant risk
that they will not recoup their investment. Unfortunately, some
broker-dealers have aggressively marketed private placements in
speculative, even fraudulent, ventures to unsophisticated retail

27. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Testimony Concerning the SEC's Recent
SEC. &
Actions with Respect to Auction Rate Securities, U.S.
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony
/2008/tsO9l8O8lct.htm.
28. Auction Rate Securities: What Happens When Auctions Fail, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/P038207
(last updated Nov. 18, 2008).
29. The SEC posted the settlements and other documents on its website.
See Auction Rate Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXcHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/ars.htm(last modified July 5, 2011).
30. See Thomsen, supra note 27 (noting that investors could not access
their funds for important short term needs after brokers had led them to believe

their investments were safe and liquid).
31. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2012).
32. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 119, 124-25
(1953); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012) (providing an exemption from
registration).
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investors. 33 In 2011, the Massachusetts Securities Division and
Securities America ("SA"), a subsidiary of Ameriprise Financial,
Inc., settled an administrative proceeding involving SA's actions as
placement agent for the sale of Medical Capital promissory notes in
private placements from 2003 to 2007.34
As alleged in the
complaint, SA aggressively marketed the notes to unsophisticated
investors and represented that it had "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the investments were suitable for them, without
informing the investors of material risks that the firm's own due
diligence analyst specifically requested the firm to disclose.35
Medical Capital was almost certainly a Ponzi scheme, 36 and if the
salespersons understood this, they committed securities fraud.37 Yet
apparently some of the SA brokers invested their personal funds in
Medical Capital, suggesting that they did not understand the
investments they were recommending.38 Perhaps for this reason,
the consent order charges the firm with "unethical or dishonest
conduct or practices" 3 9 and not with fraud.
As another example, in 2011, FINRA sanctioned ten firms and
seventeen individuals for selling interests in private placements
without having a reasonable basis for recommending the
investments. 40 Specifically, FINRA found that
the broker-dealers did not have adequate supervisory systems
in place to identify and understand the inherent risks of these
offerings and, as a result, many of the firms failed to conduct
adequate due diligence of these offerings. In addition, some of
the firms did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the

33. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma:A Regulatory Ponzi
Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 993 (2012) (describing sales of promissory
notes at Medical Capital).
34. Consent Order at 2, Securities America, No. 2009-0085 (Mass. Sec. Div.
May 23, 2011), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/archived/sctsalsa
order.pdf.
35. Administrative Complaint at 3-4, Securities America, No. 2009-0085
(Mass. Sec. Div. Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct
/archived/sctsalsacomplaint.pdf.
36. Johnson, supra note 33, at 999.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (stating grounds for securities fraud
violations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (stating grounds for securities fraud
violations).
38. Johnson, supra note 33, at 1007.
39. Consent Order, supra note 34, at 18.

40. FINRA Sanctions Eight Firms and 10 Individuals for Selling Interests
in Troubled Private Placements, IncludingMedical Capital,Provident Royalties
and DBSI, Without Conducting a Reasonable Investigation, FINRA (Nov. 29,
2011), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2011/pl25193

[hereinafter

FINRA Sanctions Eight Firms and 10 Individuals]; FINRA Sanctions Two
Firms and Seven Individuals for Selling Private Placements Without
Conducting a Reasonable Investigation, FINRA (Apr. 7,
2011),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2011/Pl23441.
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private placements were suitable for any of their customers.
Additionally, the sanctioned principals did not have reasonable
grounds to allow the firms' registered representatives to
continue selling the offerings, despite the numerous "red flags"
that existed regarding the private placements. 4 1
C.

Non-traded Real Estate Investment Trusts
Non-exchange traded real estate investment trusts, or nontraded REITs, pool the capital of investors to purchase a portfolio of
income-producing real estate. 42 Because REITs must distribute at
least ninety percent of their taxable income to their investors, they
are attractive to investors who seek periodic distributions. 4 3
Frequently, however, the distributions are financed by borrowings
or are even a return of the investors' principal. 44 Non-traded REITs
are generally illiquid, and since many REITs are offered as private
placements, they present the same risks as described above. The
fees charged to the customers are high. 45
Both FINRA and State Attorneys General have brought
enforcement actions against broker-dealers for abusive practices in
the sale of non-traded REITs to unsophisticated investors. For
example, in October 2012, FINRA sanctioned David Lerner
Associates, its founder and CEO, and its head trader for targeting
unsophisticated and elderly investors in sales of a non-traded
REIT.46 The charges included excessive markups, inadequate due
diligence in determining the suitability of the investments, and
misleading marketing materials.4 7 In announcing the settlement,
FINRA's Chief of Enforcement cautioned that "[flirms must conduct
a thorough suitability analysis before selling products, and make
accurate disclosure of risks and features at the point of sale,
especially with alternative investments such as non-traded
REITs."48
Similarly, the Massachusetts Securities Division recently
settled charges with LPL Financial LLC involving its sales of non-

41. FINRA Sanctions Eight Firms and 10 Individuals,supra note 40.
42. Public Non-Traded REITs-Perform a Careful Review Before
Investing, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourselflinvestoralerts
/reits/pl24232 (last updated Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Public not Traded

REITs].
43.

Popper, supra note 6.

44. Public Non-Traded REITs, supranote 42.
45.

Id.

46. FINRA Sanctions David Lerner Associates $14 Million for Unfair
Practices in Sale of Apple REIT Ten and for Charging Excessive Markups on
Municipal Bonds and CMOs, FINRA (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.finra.org
/newsroom/newsreleases/2012/pl91729.

47. Id.
48. Id.
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traded REITs.49 According to the state, LPL brokers regularly sold
non-traded REITS to customers who did not meet the net worth and
annual income suitability standards set forth in the prospectuses or
in amounts that exceeded the state's ten percent concentration limit
for non-traded REITs.50 Supervisors of salespersons failed to follow
the due diligence and oversight procedures set forth in the firm's
own compliance manual and written supervisory procedures.5 1
D.

ProprietaryMutual Funds

Some brokerage firms have affiliates that sponsor their own
mutual funds, known as proprietary mutual funds, which are
marketed to retail investors. These funds generally have higher
costs than comparable funds. 52 The promotion by brokerage firms of
their proprietary funds presents an obvious conflict of interest.5 3 In
2012, for example, former brokers at JPMorgan Chase asserted that
they were encouraged to promote proprietary funds even when
competitors had better-performing or cheaper options. 54 FINRA
prohibits sales contests that favor proprietary funds because these
"types of sales contests . . . increase[] the potential for investors to be

steered into investments that are less suitable than some
alternatives." 55 Investment advisers may also succumb to the
49. Consent Order at 1, LPL Financial, LLC - Non Traded REITS, E-20120036 (Mass. Sec. Div. Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct
/current/sctlpl/LPL%202012-0036%20Consent%200rder.pdf.
LPL Financial,
the fourth-largest brokerage firm in the U.S., has come under increasing
regulatory scrutiny about its sales practices as it has expanded its business.

Nathaniel Popper, Fast-Growing Brokerage Firm Often Tangles with
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at Al.
50. Consent Order, supra note 49, at 4.

51. Id. at 6, 23-25.
52. Ken Hawkins, Mutual Funds: Brand Names vs. House Brands,
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund

/08/proprietary-mutual-funds.asp; Daniel Solin, Lessons from Proprietary
Mutual Fund Returns, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 3, 2012),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/On-Retirement/2012/05/03/lessons-from
-proprietary-mutual-fund-returns.

53. See Mutual Funds: Who's Looking Out for Investors?: Hearing on H.R.
2420 Before the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 76-114, 254-63, 271-80 (2003)
(statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Vice Chairman and President, Regulatory
Policy and Oversight, NASD) (describing common abuses in mutual fund sales).
54. Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Conflict Seen in Sales

Tactic at JPMorgan:Bank Is Said to Favor Its Own Products, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 2012, at Al (explaining that ex-brokers said JPMorgan favored Bank's funds
over others); Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Selling the Home
Brand: A Look Inside an Elite JPMorgan Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2013, at 1

[hereinafter Selling the Home Brand].
55. NASD Fines Morgan Stanley $2 Million for Prohibited Mutual Fund
Sales Contests, FINRA

(Sept.

16,

2003),

http://www.finra.org/Newsroom

/NewsReleases/2003/P002879; see also NASD Fines Long Island Brokerage Firm
David Lerner Assoc. $100,000 for ProhibitedMutual Fund and Variable Product
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temptation to favor proprietary mutual funds. In 2008, for example,
the SEC brought a disciplinary proceeding against an investment
adviser that disregarded its stated guidelines for selecting mutual
funds for clients in a mutual fund wrap fee program and instead
focused on subjective criteria that favored its proprietary funds. 56
In addition to the problem of proprietary funds, calculation of
the costs of investing in certain mutual funds can be difficult
because of various share classes with different costs, breakpoints,
and loads.5 7 Many retail investors may not understand the
importance of costs and their effect on returns or may be confused
by the different options,5 8 and their brokers may not adequately
explain the differences or may not even select the suitable options
for their customers. FINRA has brought a number of enforcement
actions against brokerage firms for suitability violations regarding
sales of mutual funds with different classes. For example, it found
that over an eighteen-month period, Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo, and
Linsco "recommended and sold Class B and/or Class C share mutual
funds to their customers without considering or adequately
disclosing, on a consistent basis, that an equal investment in Class
A shares would generally have been more advantageous to those
customers in view of all relevant considerations." 59 The firms were
fined a total of $19.4 million, an amount that approximated the

Sales Contests, FINRA (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom
/NewsReleases/2004/P002837.
56. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8913,
Exchange Act Release No. 57748, Investment Company Act Release No. 28261,
93 SEC Docket 230, at 1-3 (May 1, 2008), available at http://sec.gov

/litigation/admin/2008/33-8913.pdf.
57. See Mutual Fund Classes, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE

COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclass.htm
(last modified Jan. 15, 2013)
(explaining differences between different classes of mutual fund shares).
FINRA's website has several Investor Alerts on mutual fund classes of shares
and breakpoints. See Mutual Funds & ETFs, FINRA, http://www.finra.org
/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/MutualFunds/ (last visited June 9,
2013). The website also has a Fund Analyzer that estimates the value of funds
and the impact of fees and expenses on investments. See Fund Analyzer,
FINRA, http://apps.finra.org/fundanalyzer/l/fa.aspx (last visited June 9, 2013).
58. See Calculating Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfc/mfcc-int.htm
(last modified Aug. 10, 2010).

59. NASD Fines Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo and Linsco $19.4 Million For
Improper Sales of Class B and C Mutual Fund Shares, FINRA (Dec. 19, 2005),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/p015753;

accord

NASD

Fines Citigroup Global Markets, American Express and Chase Investment
Services More Than $21 Million for Improper Sales of Class B and C Shares of
Mutual Funds, FINRA (Mar.
/NewsReleases/2005/pO13648.

23,

2005),

http://www.finra.org/Newsroom
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additional commissions received by the firms for these unsuitable
sales.60
E.

VariableAnnuities
Variable annuities are complex products that combine aspects of
securities and insurance. 61 They resemble mutual funds but
typically offer three features not associated with mutual funds: taxdeferred treatment of earnings, a death benefit, and annuity payout
options that can provide guaranteed income for life.62 Some brokerdealers aggressively market variable annuities to senior investors,
frequently by playing on their fears that they will run out of income
in their retirement. 63 Because of these products' complexity and the
variety of available features, because of their limitations, and
because of their high costs, a registered representative must
exercise care to ascertain that a particular product is suitable for his
customer. 64 Unfortunately, many representatives do not exercise
sufficient due diligence and, in fact, may not themselves understand
the product they are selling. In addition, exchanging variable
annuities for the purpose of generating commissions is another
common abusive sales practice.6 5
FINRA Rule 2330, adopted in 2007, imposes enhanced
compliance and supervisory systems on firms with respect to sales
and exchanges of deferred variable annuities in order to provide
additional protections to investors.66 The requirements include (1)

60. NASD Fines Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo and Linsco $19.4 Million For
Improper Sales of Class B and C Mutual Fund Shares, supra note 59.
61. In general, a variable annuity is a contract between an investor and an
insurance company in which the insurance company promises to make periodic
payments to the contract owner or beneficiary, starting immediately (an
immediate variable annuity) or at some future time (a deferred variable
annuity). 07-53 SEC Approves New NASD Rule 2821 Governing Deferred
Variable Annuity Transactions; Effective Date: May 5, 2008, FINRA n.2,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&elementid=3004
(last visited June 9, 2013).
62. Variable Annuities: Beyond the Hard Sell, FINRA, http://www.finra.org
/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndInsurancep005976 (last
updated Aug. 31, 2009).
63. Id.
64. Id. (recommending variable annuities that brokers must explain to
customers including important facts such as liquidity issues, fees and market
risk, and conducting suitability analysis).
65. Should You Exchange Your Variable Annuity?, FIN. INDUSTRY
REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts
/AnnuitiesAndlnsurance/P006045 (last updated Mar. 2, 2006) (warning that a
salesperson may recommend an exchange of variable annuities to generate
additional business).
66. Rule 2330. Members' Responsibilities Regarding Deferred Variable
Annuities,
FINRA
(2012),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display
.html?rbid=2403&record id=14663&elementid=8824&highlight=2330#rl4663
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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specific suitability obligations on purchases or exchanges of deferred
variable annuities on the part of the registered representative; (2)
review and approval by a principal of all transactions prior to
transmitting the application to the insurance company; (3)
heightened
supervisory
procedures,
including
surveillance
procedures to determine if salespersons enter into inappropriate
exchanges; and (4) specific training programs for registered
representatives who sell, and principals who review, transactions in
deferred variable annuities, including training on the material
features of the products.67
Despite considerable regulatory attention to the problem,
abuses continue. A 2009 FINRA settlement with Fifth Third
Securities Inc. ("FTS") is typical.6 8 FINRA found that FTS made 250
unsuitable sales and exchanges of variable annuities to 197
customers through 42 individual brokers in a three-year period. 69
Many of the brokers worked in bank branches and used the bank's
lists of customers with maturing certificates of deposit. 70 Many of
the customers were elderly or unsophisticated investors with
conservative investment goals and a need for liquidity.7 1 FINRA
also found that FTS's supervisory systems and procedures were
inadequate to prevent unsuitable transactions, despite the presence
of numerous red flags. 72
Certain similarities are present in these five examples. First,
these are complicated products. Second, registered representatives
sell these products on the basis of features that may not be fully
explained to the customer, may not be fully understood by the
registered representative, or may not in fact exist. 73 Third, the
firms' compliance systems did not adequately deal with these
prevalent abusive sales practices.
Finally, the registered
representatives and the firms make a lot of money selling these
products. Consequently, it may come as no surprise that many
retail customers have been harmed by unsuitable recommendations
to purchase these products.

67. Id. (establishing sales practice standards regarding recommended
purchases and exchanges of deferred variable annuities).
68. News Release, FINRA Fines Fifth Third Securities $1.75 Million for 250
UnsuitableAnnuities Transactions, FINRA (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.finra.org
/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2009/P1 18471.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ARSs (liquidity and safety), REITs (periodic income distributions),
promissory note (high yield), annuity ("guarantee" of retirement income, tax
benefits), proprietary funds ("name brand").
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III. EXPLORING ANOTHER SOLUTION: PROFESSOR JENSEN'S
INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK

Currently, the securities industry, regulators, and academics
are engaged in a vigorous debate over the appropriate standard of
conduct for regulating the sales practices of providers of investment
advice to retail investors. The debate is usually framed as a choice
between the fiduciary standard applicable to investment advisers
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the
suitability standard applicable to broker-dealers registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with investment advisers
asserting that the fiduciary standard is more protective of
investors. 74 Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act required the SEC to conduct a six-month
study of the issue and authorized the agency to adopt, with certain
critical limitations, a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers who
provide advice to retail investors.75 SEC staff released the required
study in January 2011 and recommended establishing a uniform
fiduciary standard "consistent with the standard that currently
applies to investment advisers." 76 After the release of the study, it
was expected that the SEC would release proposed rules for public
comment.

Business Roundtable v.

Securities and Exchange

Commission,7 7 however, shook the SEC's confidence in its ability to
adopt rules that would survive judicial scrutiny. The agency took no
further action until March 2013, when it released a request for
information on the duties of broker-dealers and investment advisers,
"in particular quantitative data and economic analysis, relating to
the benefits and costs that could result from various alternative
approaches regarding the standards of conduct and other obligations
of broker-dealers and investment advisers." 78
Much of the contentious debate over the fiduciary duty standard
has focused on whether the investment adviser's obligation to act in

74. See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor ProtectionAfter the

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct, 13 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 59, 64-66 (2010) (describing the legal standards).
75. Id. at 70-72 (describing § 913 and the limits imposed on the SEC's
authority).
76. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS, at ii (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies
/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. Two SEC Commissioners objected to the release of the
study as premature because of the lack of empirical evidence of harm to retail
investors. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Statement by SEC

Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm.
77. 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating proxy access rule
because of insufficient consideration of economic factors).
78. Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, 78 Fed. Reg.
14,848, 14,848 (Mar. 7, 2013).
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the best interests of the client is a higher standard than the brokerdealer's suitability standard. Despite the vociferous debate between
the broker-dealer and investment adviser communities over this
issue, there is, as I have previously demonstrated, scant legal
support for the supposed distinction between the two standards.79
Moreover, adoption of a so-called uniform fiduciary standard is
unlikely to improve the quality of investment advice and advance
retail investor protection, both because of significant limitations on
any standard imposed by Congress80 and because investors have no
remedies under the federal securities laws against their investment
advice providers (either investment advisers or broker-dealers) in
the absence of fraud.81 I have argued previously for adoption of a
standard of conduct based on professionalism and creation of a
federal negligence remedy, an approach that could provide more
meaningful protection for retail customers. 82 In this Essay I explore
whether Michael Jensen's integrity framework, which focuses on
improving business performance, offers another approach for
improving broker-dealers' sales practices.
Jensen describes integrity as the state of being whole, complete,
unbroken, unimpaired, sound, in perfect condition. 83 His emphasis
is on integrity as a necessary condition for maximum performance:
"As the integrity (the state of being whole and complete, etc.) of an
object, system, person, or other human entity or practice declines,
workability declines, and as workability declines the opportunity for
performance declines." 84 Jensen presents his integrity model as
independent of any normative value judgments,8 5 although for many
of us it is difficult to dissociate "whole and complete" from a value
judgment. Jensen asserts that his model is empirically testable:
"'Long run value maximization requires integrity' is a positive
proposition that is testable and refutable." 86
The attractiveness of Jensen's model in the context of brokerdealers' sales practices is that it resonates with the industry's
emphasis on trust and its importance as a business strategy.

79. Black, supra note 74, at 85-87.
80. Id. at 71-72.
81. Black, supra note 26, at 104-06. Investors have limited remedies under
state law. Id. at 107-17.
82. See generally Black, supra note 74; Black, supranote 26.
83. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining that this definition of
integrity does not include a normative content, i.e., not "the normative concepts
of 'being of sound moral principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity"').
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Werner H. Erhard et al., Integrity: A Positive Model that Incorporates
the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and Legality 7 (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts., Research Paper No. 06-11, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=920625.
86. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 13 (describing integrity as a
"necessary but not sufficient condition for long-run value maximization").
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FINRA's core principle is that "[a] member, in the conduct of its
business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade."87 FINRA generally describes this
as an ethical principle for the protection of investors,8 8 but brokerdealers certainly understand the importance of trust in soliciting
business and use it in their promotional materials. Television
commercials portray broker-dealers as knowledgeable trusted family
advisors working tirelessly to achieve their customers' investment
goals. The website of one brokerage firm prominently displays a
customer's testimonial: "I not only like you, but I trust you." 89
Another emphasizes that "[y]our Financial Advisor becomes your
personal advocate-gaining an understanding of your needs,
advising you and helping you select the right capabilities from our
company to meet them." 90 Surely, then, these businesses would
recognize Jensen's essential premise:
that out-of-integrity
businesses cannot, in the long term, fare well.
Ponzi schemes are egregious examples of fraud and, using
Jensen's terminology, can be described as the most "out-of-integrity"
system in the securities industry: while early participants receive
"profits" from the contributions of later participants, the enterprise
is doomed to failure because it is a broken business model.9 1 I
suggest that out-of-integrity practices can extend to the sales
practices that I described in Part II where the conduct may not rise
to the level of intentional wrong. Because securities professionals
owe their customers a duty to understand the products they are
selling, to have a reasonable basis for believing that their
recommendations are suitable for their customers, and to explain
them accurately to investors, their failures to do so constitute what
Jensen describes as out-of-integrity conduct.
Jensen describes integrity as an "ontological law of human
nature,"92 a "necessary but not sufficient condition for long-run
87. 2010. Standards of Commercial Honor and Principlesof Trade, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&recordid=6905
&element id=5504&highlight=2010#r6905
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
Conduct that violates another specific rule, such as FINRA Rule 2111, will also
violate Rule 2010.
88. Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc., FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid
=2403&elementid=4589 (last visited June 11, 2013).
89. Reviews
and
Awards,
CHARLES
SCHWAB,
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/why-chooseschwab/awards
_andoffers (last visited June 11, 2013) (recounting the experience of a Charles
Schwab customer on meeting her Schwab Financial Consultant).
90. Our Approach, MORGAN STANLEY, http://www2.morganstanley.com
/wealthlourapproach/ (last visited June 11, 2013).
91. What is a Ponzi Scheme?, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-ponzi.shtml (last modified Apr. 2,
2013).
92. Erhard et al., supra note 85, at 19.
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value maximization," 93 and focuses on integrity as a factor of
production: 94 as integrity declines, the opportunity for performance
declines.9 5 In contrast, whether described as FINRA's "just and
equitable principles of trade,"9 6 the investment adviser's fiduciary
duty, 97 the broker-dealer's suitability requirement, 98 or my
professionalism standard,9 9 the conduct standards applicable to
retail investment advice providers establish legal standards for
judging conduct that, in addition, have an ethical component that
Jensen disavows. Accordingly, because of their different purposes,
one needs to be cautious in making comparisons. Nevertheless,
because the brokerage industry is built upon trust and confidence
and firms advertise on that basis, 0 0 Jensen's proposition that "long
run value maximization requires integrity" 101 should resonate with
the industry.
Jensen's bedrock principle for operating with integrity is
"honoring your word," which he defines as either keeping your word,
or, as soon as you know that you will not, owning up and cleaning up
the mess you have caused. 10 2 Jensen repeatedly tells us that
integrity requires doing cost-benefit analyses before giving your
wordl 03 and not later, when deciding whether to keep your word.104
In the five instances described above, it seems clear that, under
Jensen's model, retail investment providers and their firms engage
in conduct that is "out-of-integrity." Acting with integrity requires
that when the registered representative recommends an investment
or strategy to a customer, he is making a representation that the
necessary due diligence has been performed to determine the
suitability of the investment for the customer; he is not simply
making a sales pitch. The firm, in turn, is responsible for the
conduct of its sales force and must have measures in place to assure

93. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 13.
94. Erhard et al., supra note 85, at 85-86.
95. Id. at 30.
96. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
101. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 13.
102. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at 20; see also Videotape: Michael Jensen: Beyond Agency Theory
2013), available at
(Wake Forest University School of Business
vastly
is
("Sincerity
http://capitalism.wfu.edulvideos/jensen-michaell
overrated.").
104. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 20-21. As someone who taught
contract law for many years, I find the contrast with the prevailing contractual
theory (based on economic theory) of "the efficient breach" startling. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 763 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that
economic theory encourages breaking promises when it is economically
efficient).
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that they are acting with integrity. Acting with integrity also
requires a registered representative to explain to the customer the
salient features of the investment, including the costs, when
recommending a complicated product.105 Acting with integrity also
means that if the sales representative or the firm subsequently
discovers that the recommendation is not in fact suitable, one of
them will take steps to correct the situation without regulatory
compulsion to do so. The previously described sales practices of the
brokerage firms are examples of registered representatives and
their firms acting out-of-integrity.
It should also be clear that a product or strategy that results in
losses is not, for that reason, out-of-integrity. Investing entails risks
and disappointments, and providers of investment advice are not
guarantors of success so long as they adequately explain the
investment product or strategy, particularly its risks, to their
customers.
Since retail investment advice providers sell their products and
services on the basis of competence and care and invite customers to
trust them, the industry apparently understands the importance of
integrity. Why then are there so many instances of broker-dealers
acting out-of-integrity?
Jensen tells us that people and organizations, while committed
to performance, systemically sacrifice integrity in the name of
increasing performance, thereby reducing performance.10 6
He
addresses the contradiction through the "integrity-performance"
paradox: if operating with integrity is so productive, why do people
systemically sacrifice their integrity and suffer the consequences? 10 7
He answers his question by positing that a "veil of invisibility"
obscures the effects of integrity on performance.1 08 In other words,
short-term profits and, in the brokerage industry, the need to close
the sale to get the commission are paramount.
Can the culture of honoring your word be instilled in the
brokerage industry, which, after all, is a business where
salesmanship is rewarded? Jensen's principal example of a business
performing with integrity (apart from his own experience at SSRN,
about which he provides little detail) is the oft-told story of Johnson
105. He would not have to provide an explanation if the agreement between
the customer and the firm was that the sales representative had discretion to
make decisions on behalf of the customer, in which case the representative
would be held to a standard of undivided loyalty.
106. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 14, 16.
107. Id. at 16-17.
108. Id. at 17-21. As specific examples of out-of-integrity conduct, Erhard
and Jensen discuss sales by Goldman Sachs to its clients of Abacus securities
without disclosing that the securities were selected by a trader who planned to
short them, id. at 25-27, and the practice of some mutual funds in allowing
favored clients to market-time transactions in violation of the fund rules, id. at
28.
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& Johnson's decision to remove Tylenol from stores nationwide. 109
This was a crisis situation, where Johnson & Johnson admirably
rose to the occasion. To my mind, Jensen provides less guidance on
dealing with the more mundane decisions. Can an environment be
created where a broker will devote the time to understanding and
explaining the intricacies of comparable variable annuities to a
customer, even though he is confident that the customer will rely on
whatever he recommends, whether she understands it or not, and
the broker will receive a sizable fee only if he sells the product? Can
an ethos be created where a broker will not recommend a private
placement to a customer because after doing the research he
concludes that the product is too risky for the investor-even though
he would receive a sizable commission for selling the product? Or
take the case of a proprietary mutual fund, whose portfolio may be
suitable for a customer, but the salesperson's research finds
comparable funds with lower costs, and he cannot come up with an
explanation to justify the proprietary fund's higher costs? Perhaps
the day will come when the brokerage industry will stop offering
certain products because the sales practices for selling them are outof-integrity, but that day has not yet come. 110
Jensen advocates creation of an environment where the sales
representatives understand the importance of keeping their word,
an where expectation is created that they will do so, and where they
are called to account when they fail to do so through training
sessions and reinforcement of the message.1 11 He makes it clear
that it is constant work: "integrity is a mountain with no top." 1 1 2
The promise of the integrity model is that, even if only modestly
successful, it could help to improve the quality of investment advice
provided to retail investors in a way that regulatory compliance
alone cannot achieve. The approach of the regulators is to require
supervisory and compliance systems to look over the shoulders of
the sales representatives in order to ascertain that they have
performed the requisite due diligence; the regulators, in turn,
examine the firms to assess the adequacy of the compliance controls.
Disciplinary proceedings describe numerous instances where

109. Erhard et al., supra note 85, at 98-99.
110. It is reported that some firms are no longer marketing proprietary
mutual funds. See Selling the Home Brand, supra note 54 (noting that
JPMorgan Chase pressured brokers to sell proprietary funds even when
competitors had better-performing and cheaper products).
111. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 16, 21 (explaining that integrity is a
process with no end, and when an organization or other human entity violates
integrity, "integrity requires it to make this clear to all others and to willingly
bear the costs of not playing by one or more of the rules of the game").
112. Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted).
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compliance is shortchanged in the face of the business necessity of
making the sales. 113
Professor James Fanto has recently advocated the reorientation
of compliance in financial firms. He describes the current approach
to compliance as an external approach based on numerous
compliance policies and procedures, where the compliance officer is
regarded as a stand-in for the regulator, and salespersons view
compliance as a necessary evil that is distinct from the business
function.114 He proposes, as an alternative, an internal perspective
in which decisions would be shaped by the policies underlying the
securities laws (presumably investor protection in the case of
broker-dealers' sales practices) and "principles of the trade, " and
compliance officers would serve to identify those policies in decision
making.115 In this way, professional and ethical standards become
part of employee decision making. 116 Fanto's approach obviously
differs from Jensen's with the former's emphasis on ethical
principles, but it has similarities, particularly with its linkage of
business decision making and integrity. Both are attempting to add
content to the frequently used phrase "culture of compliance."11 7
It is unlikely, however, that implementing an integrity model
will replace the necessity for enforcing regulatory standards.
Jensen appears to recognize the importance of enforcement: "[L]eft
to their own devices, individuals, groups and organizations behave
as though they systematically underestimate the impact of integrity
on performance." 1 8 Moreover, keeping promises is more important
when people believe the promises have legal consequences. 119
The formidable obstacle to curbing broker-dealers' abusive sales
practices is greed. The securities industry is a hyper-competitive
business, where generating profits for the firm is emphasized and
richly rewarded, while doing research and understanding your
customers' objectives may not be. The suitability obligation, in
particular, may become nothing more than an obligation imposed by
regulatory compliance and be viewed as nothing more meaningful
than filling out the suitability checklist. Time is money, and the
pressure is to close the sale and move to the next one, however

113. Id. at 27; see also id. at 44-52 (describing various disciplinary
proceedings brought against multiple companies).
114. Fanto, supra note 14, at 21-22.
115. Id. at 27-31.
116. Similarly, Professor Tamar Frankel has written about the importance
of codes of ethics at investment advisory firms in deterring insider trading.
Videotape: Symposium: The Growth and Importance of Compliance in Financial
Firms (Brooklyn Law School 2013), available at http://www.brooklaw.edu
/newsandevents/mediagallery/Videos/symposia/02-08-13/1.aspx?.
117. Fanto acknowledges that otherwise, the phrase seems devoid of
content. Fanto, supra note 14, at 28.
118. Erhard et al., supra note 85, at 70.
119. Id. at 76.
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Because of the nature of the business,

Professor Langevoort argues that "selection bias . . . favors those

able to rationalize the careful pursuit of self-interest and other
competitively adaptive traits, masking the bad odor that comes from
unabashed selfishness."120
More fundamentally, the securities industry may be an industry
that is out-of-integrity, what Jensen would call an out-of-integrity
design. 12 1 Many express skepticism about whether the industry
sells skill and expertise or simply snake oil. Professor Daniel
Kahnemann, for example, asks: "[M]y questions about the stock
market have hardened into a larger puzzle: a major industry
appears to be built largely on an illusion of skill."122
CONCLUSION

I would like to circle back to where I started. Large numbers of
U.S. workers have reached, or are approaching, retirement and
must provide for themselves in their retirement years. Many
depend on their broker-dealers to assist them through these difficult
times. Broker-dealers owe it to these workers to treat them with
integrity. Perhaps it is time for managers of financial services firms
to adopt training sessions on integrity for their sales force. It is
worth a try.

120. Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological Perspectives on the Fiduciary
Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 995, 1003 (2011) (discussing the mix of personality
traits and incentives that produce successful salesmanship in the securities
business).
121. Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 14.
122. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow 212 (2011) (emphasis
omitted).

